

## HOUSE POLITICS AND CITY POLITICS IN ARISTOPHANES\*

### I

City politics in Aristophanes are usually approached with the author's intentions in view: what effect, if any, does the author wish his play to have outside the theatre? The present piece aims to look more closely at the structures and systems presented within the plays; this is at least a desirable preliminary to historical discussion. The household in Aristophanes, and its relation to the city, are usually considered in one or two plays at a time. The present piece proceeds through the whole corpus; this should at least help future treatment of individual works. A large view of the relations between *polis* and *oikos* in Aristophanes should also enhance our view of Aristophanes' drama in general.

'House politics' uses 'politics' metaphorically; but it is reasonable to consider analogies in Aristophanes between attempts within a domestic and within a civic structure to make things happen and enhance one's position. We shall see how Aristophanes presents democratic and domestic politics through the basics of his drama: actors representing individuals in a story, a large chorus (twice the size of tragedy's), a stage building often depicting a house. Comparisons between the structures of *polis* and *oikos* are thus readily conveyed, and deeply embedded in Aristophanes' dramatic practice. The context adds encouragement. Greek literature commonly makes figurative use of language from the structure of the *oikos* for that of a political entity. So Telemachus says to the Ithacans that the father he has lost was gentle as a father in his rule of them (Hom. *Od.* 2.46–7 τὸ μὲν πατέρ' ἐσθλὸν ἀπώλεσα, ὅς ποτ' ἐν ὑμῖν | τοῖσδεσσιν βασίλευε, πατήρ δ' ὥς ἥπιος ᾗεν). Herodotus (3.89.3) says the Persians say Cambyses was a master; Cyrus was a father, for his gentleness and his devising of all good things for them. These examples refer to mythological or Oriental monarchy; but the use of domestic images for aspects of the *polis* structures increases in the fifth and fourth centuries. So the 'Old Oligarch' says that the Athenian *demos* wishes to avoid the slavery to its betters which would come from a well-ordered *polis* (1.8–9, cf. 3.11). In a society with legal slavery this image connects to the household structure; for us, the image would be much less forceful.<sup>1</sup>

\* This article began as a talk at a conference in honour of Professor Oliver Taplin; its shape has been much altered through the very helpful advice of *CQ*'s referee and editor. I have profited from conversations with Mr Robin Lane Fox and Dr Rosalind Thomas. The bibliographical references are usually to relatively recent material, from which older discussion may easily be found.

<sup>1</sup> See R.W. Brock, 'Timonieri e dottori, padri e servitori: il linguaggio figurato politico nell'ideologia democratica ed antidemocratica', in U. Bultrighini (ed.), *Democrazia e antide-mocrazia nel mondo greco. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi: Chieti, 9–11 aprile 2003* (Alessandria, 2005), 25–34, at 30–3 for an abundant collection of such images, particularly of politicians as slaves of the *demos*. J.L. Marr and P.J. Rhodes, *The 'Old Oligarch': The Constitution of the Athenians Attributed to Xenophon, Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Oxford, 2008), 3–6 argue for 431–424 as the date of the 'Old Oligarch'. The

Philosophy explores analogies between *oikos* and *polis*. In Plato's *Politicus*, πολιτικός, king, master, householder are seen as practising the same art (258e8–259d5). Aristotle disagrees (of course), but not with the basic analogy between the spheres; he thinks that while ruling one's children is kingly, ruling one's wife is more leader-like and πολιτικός (*Pol.* 1.1252a7–b27, 1255b16–22, 1259a39–b4). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, households provide *δμοιώματα ... καὶ οἶον παραδείγματα* of constitutions; so πατρική ... ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἢ βασιλεία εἶναι (8.1160b22–7, cf. 1160b27–1161b10, *Eth. Eud.* 7.1242a1–13). As the *Ecclesiazusae* of c. 391 makes apparent, Aristophanes can exploit the fifth-century discussion on which Plato's political philosophy too must draw.<sup>2</sup>

However, in Aristophanes the two structures are not only related but opposed. A brief indication can be seen in a well-known passage. Euripides claims that in his dramas he made all talk volubly, wife, slave, master, young woman and old woman: this was δημοκρατικόν (*Frogs* 948–52). Whatever the ideological implications, we see here extended to the hierarchy of the household the equality of the assembly, in which any adult male citizen can talk. There is an implicit contrast between the structures in their normal condition.<sup>3</sup>

The democracy and the household work on opposing principles. The structure of the *oikos* is based on a series of hierarchical oppositions: man and woman, adult and child, free and slave, even human and animal (for animals can be agents in Aristophanes, with wills of their own). The structure of the democracy is based on quantity: the greater number prevails. Because its group of equals has been formed by removing the lower elements of the household structure (women, children, slaves), there is no necessary inconsistency between the two structures; but they contrast. The hierarchies on which the household was based were subject to much intellectual questioning. Aristophanes reflects this, for example, in the parabasis of the *Thesmophoriazusae*, on the superiority of women; that parabasis is akin, for example, to a speech in Euripides' *Melanippe Desmotis* (fr. 494 Kannicht). Still more questioned in the fifth century was the quantitative principle of democracy; here the questioning was not only theoretical but practical, and important to fifth-century history. Such questioning probably stands in the background of plays like

imagery of the *demos* in slavery is also deployed, on the most probable view, in the *Babylonians* (fr. 71, 90 KA, etc.). Analogies of state and family are common and important from at least the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries A.D., cf. e.g. M. Foucault, 'La «gouvernementalité»', *Dits et écrits 1954–1988*, 4 vols. (Paris), 3.635–57, esp. 640–2, 644, 647, 650–2; but they do not show the crucial contrast of structures that will shortly be discussed.

<sup>2</sup> On the passages of Plato and Aristotle's *Politics*, cf. F. Ricken, *Platon. Politikos. Übersetzung und Kommentar* (Göttingen, 2008), 92–9. For the intellectual context of the *Ecclesiazusae* cf. P.J. Rhodes, 'Aristophanes and the Athenian assembly', in D.L. Cairns and R.A. Knox (edd.), *Law, Rhetoric and Comedy in Classical Athens: Essays in Honour of Douglas M. MacDowell* (Swansea, 2004), 223–7, at 229–30.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E. Hall, 'The sociology of Greek tragedy', in P. Easterling (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, 1997), 93–126, at 125–6. CQ's referee compares 'Old Oligarch' 1.10. M.P. Noël, 'Remarques sur quelques termes appartenant au vocabulaire de la démocratie chez Aristophane', *Ktēma* 28 (2003), 83–6 discusses Aristophanes' use of δημοκρατ-, and δημοτικός (in fact about equally common); δημοκρατ- suggests a structural point. The fragments of Old Comedy suggest, but cannot establish, that Aristophanes' interest in relating *oikos* and *polis* was distinctive; however, it would be good to know more of, say, Pherecrates' *Τυραννίς* (cf. fr. 152 KA; of fr. 200 we cannot even be sure that ταύτας are women).

the *Knights* or the *Lysistrata* (where a conspiracy takes over the acropolis), whether or not those plays imply criticism of the democratic structure itself.<sup>4</sup>

But Aristophanes' particular interest is in how the structures operate, and in how an individual works within and especially against their intrinsic principles and allocations of power. In the household, the individual member, if other than the father and master, must contend against his, her or its hierarchical superiors; in the *polis*, the individual must contend against the mass of the *demos* or the like. In dramatic terms, we see a *prima facie* distinction between the conflict of individuals with each other and the conflict of an individual with a large group. The struggle of individual with group appears even when an individual citizen disinterestedly seeks to alter the views of the *demos*, as the *polis* structure allows (the *polis* depends on the ideas of individuals). But this is not the commonest situation in Aristophanes. For a genre concerned with drama, humour and telling a story, the evasion or inversion of structures inevitably holds more potential than everything ticking along nicely.

## II

The main section of this article will look swiftly through the extant plays. The aim is simply to give some indication of how extensively the two structures run through the corpus, and of how much they are mingled and opposed. In particular, we will see how things are done to, with and despite those structures by individuals and groups. The accent is not on the external meaning that is to be inferred – though interpretation is not wholly excluded; nor will the accounts of the plays often analyse how the use of the structures generates humour. The humorous character of the plays (which so increases the problems of meaning) is naturally presupposed throughout. One play, the *Wasps*, will be reserved for more extended treatment in the third section, so as to illustrate the treatment of these structures in more detail. The final section will draw together some of the points that run through the discussions.

<sup>4</sup> On the Athenian *oikos* as hierarchical, see e.g. S. Humphreys, *The Family, Women and Death: Comparative Studies*<sup>2</sup> (Ann Arbor, 1993), 2. J.B. Grossman, 'Family relationships on two grave reliefs from the Athenian agora', in G. Hoffmann (ed.), *Les Pierres de l'offrande. Autour de l'œuvre de Christoph W. Clairmont* (Zurich, 2001), 115–24 argues that the representation of the family in art may be less hierarchical than is often thought; we shall see other and clearer areas where the presuppositions in Aristophanes simplify realities. Cf. also S. Lape, 'Solon and the institution of the "democratic" family form', *CJ* 98 (2002–3), 117–39, and the argument of M. Stansbury-O'Donnell, *Vase-Painting, Gender, and Social Identity in Archaic Athens* (Cambridge, 2006), 224–9 for fluctuations in the status of women (with relation to the period before Aristophanes). For further discussion of the Athenian family, cf. e.g. L. Foxhall, 'Household, gender and property in Classical Athens', *CQ* 39 (1989), 22–44; S.B. Pomeroy, 'Women's identity and the family in the classical polis', in R. Hawley and B.M. Levick (edd.), *Women in Antiquity: New Assessments* (London, 1995), 111–21; C.B. Patterson, *The Family in Greek History* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1998), and other works cited below. K.M. De Luca, *Aristophanes' Male and Female Revolutions: A Reading of Aristophanes' Knights and Assemblywomen* (Lanham, etc., 2005), 125–6 regards Athenian politics as hierarchical because the state rules; it will be clearest here to avoid such a usage of 'hierarchical'. A different qualification of equality is produced by the gods: see on the *Peace* in Section II. On the parabasis of the *Thesmophoriazousae* cf. A. Bierl, *Der Chor in der Alten Komödie. Ritual und Performativität* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 126, Munich and Leipzig, 2001), 214–51, esp. 220–4.

*Acharnians*

The *Acharnians* presents an individual who eventually detaches himself from the structure of the *polis*. Dicaeopolis makes peace not just for himself but also *τοῖσι παιδίοισι καὶ τῇ πλατύνῃ* (131–2). The whole household is involved – slave, daughter, wife, future grandchildren – in Dicaeopolis’ domestic version of the Rural Dionysia (241–79). The clash of family and city is forcefully dramatized when this celebration of the family is interrupted by the violent mass of the Acharnian chorus. The chorus stands for the deme, which itself stands for the *polis* in its most belligerent aspect (cf. 626 *τὸν δῆμον μεταπέθει*). The conflict of individual and mass is dramatized in the prolonged struggle of character against chorus. Here we see an individual set against irate multitudes; in the first part of the play, we see him set against bureaucracy and indifference. The opposition of individuals without office (*ἰδιῶται*) and the people as a whole is often seen in fifth- and fourth-century writing.<sup>5</sup>

Yet, with an ironic twist, the state itself is manipulated by self-interested individuals, deceitful, like Cleisthenes, or loudly rhetorical, like Pericles (526–34). At 515–19 Dicaeopolis’ speech emphatically separates the acts of the corrupt sycophants from the city (*ἡμῶν γὰρ ἄνδρες, κοῦχί τὴν πόλιν λέγω, | μέμνησθε τοῦθ’, ὅτι οὐχί τὴν πόλιν λέγω ...*). At 618–19 he undercuts the war-mongering Lamachus’ appeals to democracy (*ὦ δημοκρατία ...*): Lamachus is only in it for the pay. Unlike such people, Dicaeopolis, while removing himself from the system, spectacularly persuades (*μεταπέθει* 626) the violent masses by rational argument (it counts for such within the play). The comedian too is an individual, pitted against the individual politician Cleon, and seeking to persuade the people (cf. 496–503, 627–64). Deceit, rhetoric, argument are all means for the one to prevail upon the many; we will see that some of these means are deployed also in the *oikos*, some belong distinctively to the *polis*.<sup>6</sup>

Still further figures display or manipulate the *oikos* structure, as they are disadvantaged by the *polis* structure. The villainous Megarian does not have Dicaeopolis’ affection for his daughters: he would sell even his wife and mother if he could (815–17: a hierarchy of female roles is implied). He makes his family part of his deceit. He intends to negotiate outside his own state, which is being damaged by officials (*probouloi*, 754–8). But within the *oikos*, despite his position, he cannot simply command his daughters: he must persuade them, however crudely, by the imperative of hunger (733–4 *ἀκούετε δῆ, ποτέχετ’ ἐμὴν τὴν γαστέρα· | πότερα πεπρᾶσθαι χρήιδδεν’ ἢ πεινῆν κακῶς*). The bridegroom and bride also operate outside the *polis*, to preserve conjugal pleasures at home (cf. *οἰκουρῇ* 1060); only the woman succeeds, because she is not part of the city’s decision-making structure (1062 *ὅτι γυνή ’στι τοῦ πολέμου τ’ οὐκ αἰτία*).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. e.g. Thuc. 2.60.3–6 – where individuals are connected to houses. The general notion that the chorus can symbolically and visually stand for a mass does not seem too difficult in Old Comedy. In the *Thesmophoriazusae*, for example, all the citizen wives of Athens are presented on stage, principally through the chorus. Earlier in the *Acharnians*, the Athenian assembly has been depicted on stage.

<sup>6</sup> On tensions between an individualistic and a communal ethos in Aristophanes, cf. A.H. Sommerstein, *Talking about Laughter and Other Studies in Greek Comedy* (Oxford, 2009), 204–5. See also M.R. Christ, *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 2006), ch. 1 for the problems of selfishness and collective self-interest.

*Knights*

In the *Knights*, the city structure is allegorically presented as a house structure. The slave must deploy special means to exceed the hierarchy and control his master, as the individual *rhetor* must deploy special means to escape the quantitative structure and control the *demos*. In both cases, a structure is being violated, in a morally dubious fashion. Domestically, the situation is helped by the master's old age and his want of physical strength and energy. His condition connects allegorically with the city's present want of selflessness (especially in its individual generals, 565–80), and with its foolish dedication to a pointless war (cf. 1331–4). The domestic and the political exploitation of concrete allurements are linked. The Paphlagonian's offers of physical comforts and personal kindness to the old man are equated with his use of jury pay and the stolen gain of Pylos to bribe the *demos* and show them his goodwill (50–7; so 51, with piled-up imperatives, ἐνθοῦ, ρόφησον, ἔντραγ', ἔχε τριώβολον).<sup>7</sup>

The Paphlagonian endlessly parades his love for master and *demos* (amorous e.g. 732 ἐραστής τ' εἰμι σός, cf. Agoracritus 1341; not specifically amorous e.g. 773 καὶ πῶς ἂν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον σε φιλῶν ... γένοιτο πολίτης;). But he is ferocious towards other slaves or politicians. A neat way of dealing with rivals and larger opposing bodies (like the Knights) is to present them as conspirators: that is, part of a smaller body with violent and – via the principle of quantity – immoral designs on the larger (236, 257; 626–9 he denounces 'conspirators' with thunderous and persuasive rhetoric before the *boulê*; 860–3 his exposures are a proof of love, accompanied by shouting: κέκραγα). His constant stirring-up and shaking combines deceit with forceful action. The noise and violence of the Paphlagonian's language satirize a style of rhetoric actually deployed in the equality of the *polis*; it comes incongruously from someone low down in a domestic hierarchy. The Paphlagonian is defeated by a no more principled character, who beats him at his own game, but differs from him in his lack of ferocity. Finally this character rejuvenates Demos, and thus alters the apparent domestic situation. (In fact Demos was less gullible than he pretended, 1111–50.) Agoracritus' success too rests on language (837 [Chorus] ζηλῶ σε τῆς εὐγλωτίας).<sup>8</sup>

The praise of Agoracritus by an admiring chorus (and ironical author) introduces hierarchical language which defies the quantitative principle, and brings him near to deity: μέγιστος Ἑλλήνων ἔσει, καὶ μόνος καθεξέεις | τὰν τῇ πόλει, τῶν

<sup>7</sup> The material benefits of the *polis* structure to the *demos* strike its critics as significant (so 'Old Oligarch' 1.15–16, Pl. *Grg.* 521d6–522a8). On the use of theatrical space and *oikos* and *polis* in the *Knights*, see M. Revermann, *Comic Business: Theatricality, Dramatic Technique, and Performance Contexts of Aristophanic Comedy* (Oxford, 2006), 118–25. For the treatment of slaves in Old Comedy, see M.M. Mactoux (1980), Douleia. *Esclavage et pratiques discursives dans l'Athènes classique* (Paris, 1980); B. Zimmermann, 'Sklaven im griechischen Drama', in E. Herrmann-Otto (ed.), *Unfreie Arbeits- und Lebensverhältnisse von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart. Eine Einführung* (Hildesheim, Zurich, New York, 2005), 20–34, at 25–30; Sommerstein (n. 6), ch. 6; D. Walin, 'An Aristophanic slave: *Peace* 819–1126', *CQ* 59 (2009), 30–45. On other plays attacking demagogues, see id., 'Platon, Eupolis and the "demagogue-comedy"', in D. Harvey and J. Wilkins (edd.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes: Studies in Old Comedy* (London, 2000), 437–51. On age in Old Comedy, cf. M. Menu, 'Le motif de l'âge dans les tours proverbiaux de la Comédie Grecque', in A. López Eire (ed.), *Sociedad, política y literatura. Comedia griega antigua* (Salamanca, 1997), 133–50.

<sup>8</sup> On accusations of conspiracy, see J. Roisman, *The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2006).

ξυμμάχων τ' ἄρξεις ἔχων τρίαῖναν (838–9). Since the *demos* has been made an individual character, he too can be presented as a hierarchical sole ruler, not only over Greece and the world (βασιλεύεις 1087, βασιλεῦ 1333), but over the individuals of the city (τύραννον 1114). Such language can be used elsewhere (*Wasps* 546–9 βασιλεία of jurors' rule over individuals; Thuc. 2.63.2, 3.37.2 τυραννίς on Athens' rule over allies). But the exploitation of hierarchy in this domestic drama gives special force to these twists on the *polis* structure.

### *Clouds*

There is little city politics in the *Clouds*, though the play is full of implication for the *polis*. The contest of the Logoi particularly shows the bearing of the play on the city as a whole (cf. e.g. 918–19 Κρ. ... καὶ γνωθήσει ποτ' Ἀθηναίους | οἶα διδάσκεις τοὺς ἀνοήτους, and the entertaining assertions of 1082–1104). But the play affects to seek a complete change from the directly political *Knights* (*Clouds* 545–50). It forms one of Aristophanes' most sustained explorations of the *oikos* structure. It contrasts and entangles two houses, both embodied in the stage building: Strepsiades' family and Socrates' academy. The latter is introduced as an οἰκίδιον, in which the intellectuals live (92, 95).<sup>9</sup>

In Strepsiades' household, the hierarchy is under strain. The son's expenses have put the old father in debt. The causation is fascinatingly built up: the son follows the mother, herself from a rich and politically prestigious family; she creates in him calamitous expectations. Strepsiades disputed with the wife even over the son's name, and reached a compromise (60–5). Strepsiades, like the Megarian, does not simply command his child. He seeks to display and arouse affection, and secure a prior agreement to 'obey' or 'comply' (πείσομαι 90). The son loves his father (83 Στ. ... φιλεῖς ἐμέ; | Φε. νῆ τὸν Ποσειδῶ τουτονὶ τὸν ἵππιον); but when he hears the idea of visiting the intellectuals, he refuses. When the father finally threatens, in vain, to drive his son from the house, the son is not bothered (125 σοῦ δ' οὐ φροντιῶ, with emphatic σοῦ): his need for horses will be met by his uncle, his mother's aristocratic brother (124–5).<sup>10</sup>

In the Phrontisterion, by contrast, hierarchy is unquestioned. Socrates' status is semi-divine (cf. 223 τί με καλεῖς, ὦ ῥήμερε;); Chaerephon is the second in status, perhaps like a non-sexual wife. Authority is derived from way-out ideas, and the subtraction of usual premises. But Socrates, the shadowy question of payment apart, has no great interest in making Strepsiades do anything, certainly anything practical.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> On the door(s) and the stage building in *Clouds* see Revermann (n. 7), 207–9. A. Bierl, 'Alt und Neu bei Aristophanes (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der *Wolken*)', in A. von Müller and J. von Ungern-Sternberg (edd.), *Die Wahrnehmung des Neuen in Antike und Renaissance*, Colloquium Rauricum 8 (Munich, 2004), 1–24, at 17 sees the strife of principles in the *Clouds* as possessing a strong element of the *polis*; but the overt exploitation of this element is limited.

<sup>10</sup> On Athenian fathers and sons, see B.S. Strauss, *Fathers and Sons in Athens: Ideology and Society in the Era of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1993) (154–66 on Aristophanes); C.A. Cox, *Household Interests: Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens* (Princeton, 1998), 78–88.

<sup>11</sup> On the treatment of the sophists in the *Clouds* and other Old Comedy, cf. C. Carey, 'Old Comedy and the sophists', in Harvey and Wilkins (n. 7), 419–36; L. Edmunds, 'Socrates and the sophists in Old Comedy: a single type?', *Dioniso* 6 (2007), 180–7.

Strepsiades' second attempt at persuading Pheidippides begins from the framework which secures the Phrontisterion: confidence in the ideas, and an adoration of his masters. The son is worried that his father has gone mad (*παραφρονούντος* 844, *μανίαν* 846) – a common complication of family hierarchy in comedy. In the end, the father asks him to 'obey' (860–1 *τῶι πατρὶ | πιθόμενος*), with an appeal to reciprocity: he did the same when Pheidippides was six and wanted a toy cart. It is a curious variation of the reciprocity often used to support the structure of the *oikos* (1382–90, *Birds* 1355–7).<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the son turns on the father the violence which he himself has deployed in civic dealings with his creditors. The unworldly Socrates had not seemed violent; but Strepsiades had added violence to his jumbled version of Socrates' ideas, and Pheidippides too extends the ideas into action. Beatings are a staple resource of ancient comedy; but this comic scene is made particularly pointed by the sequence of the plot, and the moral and structural significance of beating a father. A dispute on culture – caused by a difference in age – has led to an immoral action by the stronger Pheidippides, which he claims is moral. Pheidippides subtracts the hierarchical premise, reinforced by the city's laws, that beating your father is wrong. He also argues anti-hierarchically: his father beat him when he was young, so the action is legitimate, and kind (1407–19). This turns round the father's own argument from reciprocity: he was kind to his son when he was young (1380–90). Pheidippides adds *καὶ μὲν ἔφην ἐλεύθερός γε καὶ γώ* (1414), i.e. only a mere slave is liable to beating: a hierarchical framework is implied for an anti-hierarchical case. The final twist comes when Strepsiades abandons the ideas of the Phrontisterion, and turns his violence on that house itself (*οἰκία* 1489, 1496, 1497).<sup>13</sup>

### *Peace*

The *Peace* depicts an individual, with a household, sorting out the problems of Greece. Two developments of the *polis* structure can be seen in the play: the communal action from the whole of Greece expands the structure of a single city; the role of the gods adds a hierarchical element to the equality of that structure. The latter development is also found in other plays, especially with Athena and Athens; so *Knights* 1173–6, where the demagogue makes the divinity hold over the people not her *χείρας* (Solon fr. 4.4 West) but a *χύτρα* full of soup. Here, more grimly, the gods are angry with the Greeks, and have left War in their place: the Greeks, not least the Athenian assembly, have ignored the gods' attempts to make peace (*Peace* 203–19). It is through ascending to the divine world that Trygaeus succeeds. In the character Peace a political event is turned into a single deity.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For the possibility of the father's madness cf. Sol. F 49a, d Ruschenbuch; Whitehead on Hyp. *Ath.* 17, add Lys. fr. 283 Carey.

<sup>13</sup> On the violence, cf. n. 40 below; see also M. Golden, *Childhood in Classical Athens* (Baltimore and London, 1990), 161–2. Goldoni's connected comedies *La putta onorata* (1748) and *La buona moglie* (1749) explore violence to the father with shocked fascination, and move into tragic territory; cf. II.24 in the former, and III.14 in the latter.

<sup>14</sup> *Εἰρήνη* was known as a goddess in poetry, but probably not cult: cf. e.g. Hes. *Theog.* [902], Pind. *Ol.* 13.6–10, Eur. fr. 453 Kannicht with *TrGF* 5/2.1161–2, *Or.* 1682–3; H. Maehler, *Bacchylides: A Selection* (Cambridge, 2004), 225–7. The cult of Eirene in Athens probably does not precede 375/4: see F. Jacoby, *FGrH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.523–6; see also R.E. Wycherley, *Agora iii: Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia* (Princeton, 1957), 65–7; D. Peppas-Delmouzou, 'Il quadro storico-religioso dell'altare di Brauron (IG, I<sup>3</sup> 1407 bis)', in *Epigraphica. Atti delle Giornate*

The workings of *oikos* and *polis* are sometimes glimpsed or mirrored, despite the imaginative and allegorical character of the action. The play begins from the predicament of slaves with a mad master (*μαίνεται* 54, *μανιών* 65), as the *Wasps* had done; but the madness is here only apparent. The slaves call on Trygaeus' daughters (119) to plead with their father. Near the end the children of Lamachus and the coward Cleonymus sing songs that befit their fathers (1269–1304): behaviour is transmitted to children, though more simply than in the *Clouds*. War is characterized by fierce words (243 *ὥς ἀπολείσθε τήμερον*, cf. *Knights* 239 *ἀπολείσθον, ἀποθανείσθον*), and by disturbance (266 *ταράξει τὰς πόλεις*) – not unlike Cleon, who is pointed to (269–70 *ἀλετρίβανος ... ὃς ἐκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα*). The Greeks' joint action requires not complete but multiple participation; divisions are seen both between and within peoples. The Spartans set a good example (478); the Athenians are distracted by mutual litigation (505 *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο δρᾶτε πλὴν δικάζετε*), apart from the farmers (508, 511). Hermes tells the *σοφώτατοι γεωργοί* (603) of Pericles, who inflamed the city (608) since he feared the Athenians' reaction to his misdeeds: deceit, personal interest and vehement rhetoric go together.

### *Birds*

The *Birds* expands the *polis* into a still larger structure, the cosmos. Two individuals, who abandon the *polis* and show no signs of an *oikos*, transform the cosmos through inverting its hierarchy. The birds are moved from below the humans to above the gods. They found a new *polis*; the individual Pisetaerus rules it, and finally marries Basileia ('queen'): monarchy mixes the structures of *polis* and *oikos*.<sup>15</sup>

Even in this fantastical environment, characters try to operate political structures. Pisetaerus' and Euelpides' encounter with the chorus of birds shows the encounter of individuals with a dangerous mass. Here they have prudently secured an individual ally within the mass, the hoopoe; but they must still use a salesman's rhetoric to convince the birds of their new status in the universal hierarchy. Later, dubious individuals seek to cash in on the new state as they would in a human world. Human and inhuman are startlingly combined when Pisetaerus has eaten the birds that rebelled against the democratic and obviously larger element (1583–4 *ὄρνιθές τινες | ἐπανιστάμενοι τοῖς δημοτικοῖσιν ὀρνέοις*; note *τινες*). Heracles' gluttonous interest generates comedy; but the quantitative premises of democracy must on some level be explored here.

The structures of *polis* and *oikos* interact in various ways. The scene with the father-beater (1337–71) light-heartedly but thoughtfully toys with bases in *polis* and *oikos* for the *oikos* structure. The father-beater hopes the non-human city will lack

*di Studio di Roma e di Atene in memoria di Margherita Guarducci* (1902–1999), *Opuscula Epigraphica* 10 (Rome, 2003), 91–106 – on a monument of interest for the *Peace*. The probable cult of Eirene at Epizephyrian Locri could be earlier: it is indicated on a stater of c. 380 (C.M. Kraay and M. Hirmer, *Greek Coins* [London, 1966], pl. 101 no. 291, and p. 313). See also E. Simon, 'Eirene', *LIMC* 3/1 (Zurich and Munich, 1986), 700–5, and *Eirene und Pax. Friedensgöttinnen in der Antike*, SB d. Wiss. Ges. Frankfurt 24.3 (Stuttgart, 1988), 54–84. For the recovery of the goddess cf. Ar. fr. 591.84–6 KA.

<sup>15</sup> For the relation of *polis* to *oikos* in the *Birds*, and the transformation of the birds' status, see D. Rosenbloom, 'Empire and its discontents: *Trojan Women, Birds*, and the symbolic economy of Athenian imperialism', in J. Davidson, F. Muecke, P. Wilson (edd.), *Greek Drama III: Essays in Honour of Kevin Lee*, BICS Suppl. 87 (London, 2006), 245–71, at 265–71.



the usual (and Solonian) law against beating fathers; his motivation is not hatred but the wish to gain the property (1352 ἄγχειν ἐπιθυμῶ τὸν πατέρα καὶ πάντ' ἔχειν: the line moves on to what really matters). In the midst of new and faked laws and oracles, Pisetaerus produces a law based on reciprocity: nurture by the parent produces an obligation for nurture by the child (1357 δεῖ ... τὸν πατέρα πάλιν τρέφειν; note πάλιν). Pisetaerus founds his own calm but moral treatment of the father-beater on what he learned as a child (1362–8): this tradition comes across as not suspect but valid.

Heracles is willing to deprive his father of political tyranny for the sake of food (1604–5). To ensnare him, Pisetaerus deploys cunning and Solonian law. Poseidon has pointed out that Heracles will lose the wealth he was due by inheritance if his father loses the tyranny; Pisetaerus claims the argument is cunning sophistry (1646 οἶόν σε περισοφίζεσαι), and points out that Heracles is illegitimate (1647–74). City politics and family structure are entangled; the old city's law provides the premises. Pisetaerus the politician here acts against familial (and cosmic) hierarchy, with breezy cynicism.<sup>16</sup>

### *Lysistrata*

The *Lysistrata* relates the structures of *polis* and *oikos* in a new and spectacular combination. A lower division is taken from the structure of the *oikos*, the women. They are made into a structure which goes beyond the structure of the *polis* and encompasses the whole of Greece. The division of the chorus presents a conflict, not between individual and mass, but between two equal masses; yet these masses, like the total body of men and women in the story, extend the individual husband and wife in the *oikos*.

The group of women, united when they encounter men, are often disunited on their own; Lysistrata is an individual who must impose her purpose on this large body. She does not proceed by ingratiating flattery; she can be vehement in her condemnation, but not raucous (so 137 ὃ παγκατάπυγον θῆμέτερον ἅπαν γένος; note the first person plural). When the women turn away from her initial plan, she seeks the 'vote' of a single woman, her Spartan ally (140 ὃ φίλη Λάκαινα, a striking combination). She has already laid her plans for the oldest women to capture the acropolis. The repetition of Lysistrata's oath by a representative of the women (210–37) embodies the mass's acceptance of the individual's plan.<sup>17</sup>

The later dissension within the sex-starved body of women is viewed as a kind of *stasis* (767–8 εἰς ἂν | μὴ στασιάσωμεν), which the individual must contain – rather as Thucydides' Pericles keeps the Athenians to the war despite their private losses (2.59–65.4). Lysistrata stresses the probable success of their strategy and the short time they must wait (762–7), and employs an oracle: the tricks of politicians are turned to a good end. The women, apart from the chorus, must be returned into the stage building (779 ἀλλ' εἰσίωμεν): an effectively staged representation of controlling the mass.

<sup>16</sup> On the laws cf. Sol. F 32b, 50b, 55b–c, 74a Ruschenbusch; see also Dunbar on *Birds* 757–9, 1337–71, and now *P Oxy.* 4855 col. i, with D. Colomo's notes, pp. 57, 61–2.

<sup>17</sup> C. Faraone, 'Salvation and female heroics in the parodos of Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, *JHS* 117 (1997), 38–59, at 39 views the older women as sharing in Lysistrata's authority, by contrast with the younger women; one might rather see a contrast between the women on their own and in conflict with their true inferiors the men.

The encounter between Lysistrata and the city's representative the Proboulos sets her rationality and argument against his violence (cf. 432 οὐ γὰρ μοχλῶν δέει μάλλον ἢ νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν). He does not get an extended speech, as in an ordinary *agon*; but that expresses her intellectual predominance. He is made to keep silent by force (529–38); but that pointedly reverses an inset domestic scene (507–20). There Lysistrata and the other women have attempted to persuade their husbands within the structure of the *oikos*. The husbands' imposition of silence displayed their refusal to think; in their meetings they had not used the structures of the *polis* to good effect. The tact and playfulness with which Lysistrata at first attempted her domestic manipulation gave way to forthright criticism (512–14 ἀλγοῦσαι τ' ἀνδοθεν ὑμᾶς ἐπανηρόμεθ' ἂν γελάσασαι | 'τί βεβούλευται ... ὑμῖν'; 518 'πῶς ταύτ' ... διαπράττεσθ' ὧδ' ἀνοήτως;'). To the Proboulos Lysistrata proposes transferring part of the *oikos* structure into the *polis*: financial administration should be assigned to women, not corrupt individuals (486–98).<sup>18</sup>

The scene where Lysistrata speaks to the ambassadors combines political rhetoric in an inter-city structure with the sexual attraction that cements the structure of the *oikos*. The men's desire for Diallage turns at the end into desire for their wives (1182–8), and thus embodies the success of Lysistrata's plan; the allegorical attractiveness of Diallage underlines the attractions of peace in the political argument. The comedy of the men's low-mindedness does not prevent Lysistrata's stance from appearing impressive. Her intelligence, though a woman (1124), her impartial frankness, though an Athenian (1149), lift her above the structures of *oikos* and *polis* alike. At the same time, she is shrewd enough to see the importance of female physical appeal; she has indeed arranged for Diallage's presence and feminine behaviour (1117–18 ... μηδ' ὥσπερ ἡμῶν ἄνδρες ἀμαθῶς τοῦτ' ἔδρων, | ἀλλ', ὡς γυναικας εἰκός, οἰκείως πάνυ). The women in the *Lysistrata*, unlike some tragic heroines, succeed by being women; the femininity which differentiates them in the *oikos* is vital to their victory.

This is clearly seen in the central encounter between Myrrhine and Cinesias, which offers a representative *oikos* (cf. 865–9 house, 893–7 property, 877–84, 907–9 child and nurse). Myrrhine's tactics combine sexual attraction with the teasing deployment of modesty and feigned resistance; such tactics would be seen as typically feminine (one may compare Hera in *Iliad* 14). The old women of the chorus finally overcome the old men by mothering and flirting. The female chorus-leader removes an insect from the male leader's eye and wipes away the

<sup>18</sup> On Lysistrata's rationality, cf. F. Perusino, 'Violenza degli uomini e violenza delle donne nella *Lisistrata* di Aristofane', *QUCC* NS 63 (1999), 71–8, though it need not be compromised by the carding imagery from the *oikos* (p. 78). To glance shyly at the external context, it is often thought that Lysistrata's viewpoint could not have seemed actually reasonable or possible, since, secret conspiracy apart, making peace could not have been contemplated in February 411 (forcefully argued by Sommerstein [n. 6], 228–31, 235). It seems hard to be sure; Thuc. 8.70.2, 71.3, 90.2, 91.1 could be used against as well as for the thesis about her viewpoint. Political situations are commonly seen in different lights, and discussion within wealthy households in early 411 could well have been diverse (cf. L. O'Higgins, *Women and Humor in Classical Greece* [Cambridge, 2003], 145–6 for Aristophanes' possible exploitation of real women's utterances). U. Daniel, *Arbeiterfrauen in der Kriegsgesellschaft. Beruf, Familie und Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 84 (Göttingen, 1989), 238 quotes a tragi-comic letter from the secretary of the Bavarian Bauernverein on 30.9.1918 (Munich Hauptstaatsarchiv, MInn 66332); like a milder Proboulos, he deplores the short-sighted complaints of women about the war and their lack of patriotic understanding.

moisture, bad though she says he is (καίτοι πάνυ πονηρὸς εἶ, 1035); with finely judged tactics, she boldly imposes a kiss.<sup>19</sup>

### *Thesmophoriazusae*

The *Thesmophoriazusae* again creates a mass from the second division of the *oikos*. This imitates the structure of the *polis*, in a formal assembly. This body in itself seems physically dangerous (myths like that of Pentheus lurk in the background). It can also draw on the power of the male state. The Relative is reported to it (763–4, 930–46); on the *boulê*'s decision (943 ἐδοξε τῇ βουλῇ) he is bound up, with an official Archer to guard him. Quantitatively, the individual has the disadvantage; hierarchically, he enjoys a notional superiority, but this is turned to mockery by his disguise as a woman. His means for winning over a mass involve two elements: speech-making and deceit. The situation taken over from the *Telephus* places more emphasis on deceit than does the earlier incarnation in the *Acharnians*. The Relative's speech (466–519), like that of Dicaeopolis (*Ach.* 496–556), seeks to produce a radical change of mind in its hearers; but it lacks Dicaeopolis' argumentative strength, and commits the grave rhetorical error of offending its audience. The women had admired even Critylla's speech (458–66), comically restricted though it was to the concerns of herself and her family. They recognize in the Relative the techniques of the insidious orator (529–30 ὑπὸ λίθῳ γὰρ παντί που χρὴ | μὴ δάκηι ῥήτωρ ἀθρεῖν).<sup>20</sup>

The assembly in general presents images, true and false, of women handling the house structure as hierarchical inferiors. The man's assent needs to be obtained to go outside (483–5). Deceit is a possible means of gaining what the man would not countenance, like adultery (340–1 ... ἡ δουλὴ τινὸς | προαγωγὸς οὖσ' ἐνετρύλισεν τῷ δεσπότῃ, etc.). His own sense of sexual decency can be exploited for trickery, when the childless woman is allegedly about to give birth (508–9 ἄπελθ', ἄπελθ', ἡδὴ γὰρ ὄνερ μοι δοκῶ | τέξειν; cf. 338–9, 407–8). Too suspicious and severe a treatment of the hierarchy by the men seems intolerable to the women.<sup>21</sup>

### *Frogs*

The *Frogs* offers the house structure without the house. Dionysus and Xanthias wander on their adventure through the underworld, with repeated and comic

<sup>19</sup> S.C. Stroup, 'Designing women: Aristophanes *Lysistrata* and the "hetairization" of the Greek wife', *Arethusa* 37 (2004), 37–73, at 46–62 sees the scene with Myrrhine as 'hetairization'; but the treatment of femininity here may be more involved. The line of thought is developed by K. Gilhuly, *The Feminine Matrix of Sex and Gender in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 2009), 154–76.

<sup>20</sup> On the mythical context cf. A.M. Bowie, *Aristophanes: Myth, Ritual and Comedy* (Cambridge, 1993), 212–13. The Relative wishes to escape from the *polis*-like structure to his own house (282–3, 1204–6).

<sup>21</sup> The difficulty which Aristophanes' women find in escaping the *oikos* probably exaggerates the conditions of Athenian life: cf. D. Cohen, *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1991), ch. 6; R. Just, *Women in Athenian Law and Life* (London and New York, 1989), ch. 6; C. Schnurr-Redford, *Frauen im klassischen Athen. Sozialer Raum und reale Bewegungsfreiheit* (Berlin, 1996) (79–87 on comedy). On introducing illegitimate children cf. J.F. Gardner, 'Aristophanes and male anxiety: the defence of the *oikos*', *G&R* 36 (1989), 51–62.

exchanges of status. In hierarchy, Dionysus is doubly removed from Xanthias the mortal slave (so 583 δούλος ἄμα καὶ θνητὸς ὢν). But the play draws on a recent act of the *polis*, the liberation of slaves after Arginusae, to pursue structural inversions against the background of a lively relationship. These come to a height in the see-sawing reversals of status at 460–674. So Dionysus begs Xanthias, with a wheedling *Ξανθίδιον* (582), to take the role of the god Heracles; he says that Xanthias' anger is justified, and even beating would be permissible (584–5). While beating commonly separates slave from free, Xanthias later has an ingenious anti-hierarchical argument: Dionysus if god not slave should be beaten all the more, for he will feel nothing (631–4).<sup>22</sup>

When they finally reach a house, the house of Hades, Xanthias at first expresses bravado to Pluto's slave, his colleague: his master would have regretted it if he had tried to punish him (743 ὤμωξε μέντ' αὖν). He soon swaps notes with Pluto's slave on breaching the hierarchy more slyly: cursing the master behind his back, eavesdropping and divulging secrets outside the home (745–53). Their camaraderie evokes a perspective from the bottom of the hierarchy.

The second half of the play is much concerned with the ability of individuals to affect the *polis*: not speakers in the assembly, but poets at the theatre. The parabasis, though formally voiced by τὸν ἱερὸν χορόν (686), has presented the comedian's own sound advice and teaching to the city (686–7 χρῆσθ' ἀτὰρ πόλει | ξυμπαραίνειν καὶ διδάσκειν). The tragedians agree that poets should make men better ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν (1007–10); but Aeschylus emphasizes war (e.g. 1027 νικᾶν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους), Euripides houses (e.g. 976–7 τὰς οἰκίας | οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἢ πρὸ τοῦ). Euripides' alleged muddling of these spheres connects with Socratic questioning and the aesthetic degradation of tragedy; Aeschylus sees him as damaging both households and city (so 1049–51, 1078–88). We have already seen how Euripides applies the *polis*'s principle of equality to the hierarchy of the household (952 δημοκρατικὸν γὰρ αὖτ' ἔδρων); his political commitment to that principle is questioned in turn (952–3).<sup>23</sup>

### *Ecclesiazusae*

The *Ecclesiazusae*, like the *Lysistrata* and *Thesmophoriazusae*, develops a parallel *polis* structure drawn from a lower element in the *oikos* structure. Here the women go further and actually displace the higher element from the *polis* structure. The principle of quantity is essential to their take-over; the individual Praxagora must organize the women and prevail over the men, but she prevails through the number of women present at the assembly. None the less, the hierarchical inferiority of women necessitates deceit and in particular disguise. Deceit is required on a domestic level, for the women to escape from the house and take the clothes; disguise is needed on the political level.

Later Praxagora returns triumphant from the assembly, where she has been elected to office; she congratulates the chorus for being ἐν ... τοῖς δεινοῖς

<sup>22</sup> Possible complications on the beating of slaves: N.R.E. Fisher, *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece* (Warminster, 1992), 58–60; Marr and Rhodes (n. 1), 74–5.

<sup>23</sup> At 687 the ξυμ- suits the chorus' plurality as a chorus, cf. *Thesm.* 352 ξυνευχόμεσθα (obeying εὐχέσθ' 351); otherwise Dover ('join ... those who have already been urging what we are going to urge').

ἀνδρείοταται (*Eccl.* 519). The next moment she is confronted by her husband, and moves from victory over the *polis*-structure to dexterous handling of the *oikos*-structure: she must employ deceit to explain her absence and male attire to her suspicious husband. As she ‘learns’ of what has happened in the assembly, the tables are turned, and her husband begs her not to take away his livelihood, probably as a juror (563 μηδ’ ἀφέλημι μου τὸν βίον). She must then make a speech defending the *polis*’s new set-up to him and his friend, as representatives of the structure in its previous form. Her altering roles in this short space mark the contrast, and unexpected intertwining, of home and city politics.<sup>24</sup>

Important in both her speech to the assembly and her defence within the *oikos* is the political tool of rhetoric (cf. 570–6). This tool is thought to be outside women’s usual scope (110–11 καὶ πῶς γυναικῶν θηλύφρων ξυνουσία | δημηγορήσει;); Praxagora has acquired it from male ῥήτορες (243–4). Political and legal conventions mark the long speech as a form of public persuasion. Praxagora’s speech (171–240) first dwells on the bad individuals to whom the people trusts itself. She emphasizes the people’s interest in individual gain (207 ἰδίαί ... ἕκαστος) rather than in the common good. Her argument for women’s power incorporates many elements from the *oikos*. Women, unlike the Athenian *demos*, follow tradition (215–28; 216 κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον νόμον, 221–8 ὥσπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ); they do so in domestic and other deeds (and misdeeds). This is a paradoxical argument for innovation. Their propensity for trickery will enable them to avoid being tricked when ruling (238 αὐταὶ γὰρ εἰσιν ἐξαπατᾶν εἰθισμέναι). Their present trickery in the assembly sharpens the irony.<sup>25</sup>

In Praxagora’s new scheme the *oikos* structure is to be abolished and subsumed into the *polis* structure: there are to be no separate families (635–40), and the city is to be physically turned into a single dwelling (673–4 τὸ γὰρ ἄστν | μίαν οἰκήσιν φημι ποιήσιν συρρήξασ’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα). A meeting of Blepyrus’ compliant neighbour with a cynic brings out humorously the question of moral and legal premises: is there an obligation to follow the new laws (758, 762 οὐχὶ πιεθαρχεῖν με τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ)? Will the πλῆθος follow them (770)? Are they traditional, πάτριος (cf. the ironic 778 οὐ γὰρ πάτριον τοῦτ’ ἐστίν)? Since the women now rule (830–1), the quantitative principle has been complicated. But food prevails (853–4 τί γὰρ ἔστηκ’ ἔχων | ἐνταῦθ’ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα τῇ πόλει δοκεῖ, 861–2).<sup>26</sup>

The state now also takes over and regulates what could be seen as an offshoot of the *oikos* structure: the amatory structure. This structure is composed of individuals;

<sup>24</sup> On 563 cf. Sommerstein ad loc.

<sup>25</sup> On Praxagora’s speech cf. K.S. Rothwell, *Politics and Persuasion in Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae*, Mnemosyne Suppl. 111 (Leiden, etc., 1990), ch. 4; D. Romero González, ‘Praxagora de Atenas: El silencio sonoro de la mujer política y aristofánica’, in I. Calero Secall and A. Bech (edd.), *Las hijas de Pandora. Historia, tradición y simbología* (Malaga, 2005), 65–75.

<sup>26</sup> On the *oikos* in the *Ecclesiazusae*, cf. H.P. Foley, ‘The “female intruder” reconsidered: women in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae*’, *CPh* 77 (1982), 1–21, at 14–21; P. von Möllendorff, *Grundlagen einer Ästhetik der alten Komödie. Untersuchungen zu Aristophanes und Michail Bachtin*, *Classica Monacensia* 9 (Tübingen, 1995), 121–2; A. Scholtz, *Concordia Discors: Eros and Dialogue in Classical Athenian Literature* (Cambridge, MA and London, 2007), 89–94. For the scene 730–876 cf. M.R. Christ, ‘Imagining bad citizenship in classical Athens: Aristophanes’ *Ecclesiazusae* 730–876’, in I. Sluiter and R.M. Rosen (edd.), *Kakos: Badness and Anti-value in Classical Antiquity*, Mnemosyne Suppl. 307 (Leiden and Boston, 2008), 169–83.

beauty and youth produce a hierarchy, both within couples and between rivals for a place in a couple. The principle of youth inverts a principle of the *oikos*, where an older person typically enjoys a hierarchical advantage over a younger person in the same category (fathers are older than sons, mothers than daughters). The new regime, by imposing the *oikos*'s principle of age, inverts the amatory structure. The structure of the *polis* establishes the change: *κατὰ τὸν νόμον ταῦτα ποιεῖν | ἔστι δίκαιον, εἰ δημοκρατούμεθα* (944–5).<sup>27</sup>

The public concerns of the play move to multiple private concerns. The opening scene where Praxagora waited for her fellow conspirators (with a domestic and amorous lamp) turns into a scene with an old woman waiting for the men (877 *τί ποθ' ἄνδρες οὐχ ἤκουσιν; ὥρα δ' ἦν πάλαι*, cf. 19–20 *ἀλλ' οὐδεμία πάρεστιν ἂς ἤκειν ἐχρήν. | καίτοι πρὸς ὄρθρον γ' ἐστίν*). The young Epigenes finds the need to sleep first with an old woman at odds with his free status (941 *οὐ γὰρ ἀνασχετὸν τοῦτό γ' ἐλευθέρωι*, cf. *Knights* 1305–7); the old woman asserts law, democracy and a decree (944–5 [above], 1013, 1054–5). Public arguments are used in what would previously have been a personal and non-legal dispute, not even regulated by an ordinary *oikos* structure.

Despite the absorption of the family into the state, Praxagora still has a concern for Blepyrus. She has him called to the feast (1126 *τὸν ἄνδρ' ... τῆς ἐμῆς κεκτημένης*, 1137 *ἐκέλευε ... ἡ γυνή*) – though he will arrive very late. A huge quantity of citizens has already been dining (1132–3 *πολιτῶν πλείον ἢ τρισμυρίων | ὄντων τὸ πλήθος*). The comedy plays incessantly on relations between the structures of city, house and love.<sup>28</sup>

### *Plutus*

The *Plutus* rights the operation of the *polis* structure, through a single *oikos*. The change is produced, not within the human *polis* structure but through the gods: Apollo, Asclepius and the concept of human wealth turned into a god. (He is found in previous poetry, and associated with houses: e.g. *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 488–9; Hippon. fr. 36 West [blind]). The theology and allegory exclude direct presentation of the *polis* structure; but the deceitful individuals who misuse it to their advantage are conspicuous from the start (30–1 *ρήτορες* and *συκοφάνται*). Neoclides' thefts and his tricks in the assembly are counteracted by the *φιλόπολις* Asclepius (665–6, 723–6). The sycophant claims to manage the city's affairs (919 *εἰς ἐμ' ἤκει τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγματα*, cf. 920 *προστάτην*); he has feigned devotion to the city for his own gain (900 *φιλόπολις*, 911–12). His loudness and deceit make him akin to the corrupt politicians (and sycophants) of earlier plays. He wishes to arraign the god for breaching the quantitative principle and destroying the *polis* structure: *καταλύει περιφανῶς εἰς ὧν μόνος | τὴν δημοκρατίαν, οὔτε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν | τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν οὔτε τὴν βουλὴν πιθύν* (948–50; *ἐκ. ... β. π.* Hall and Geldart:

<sup>27</sup> On the amatory conceptions in the *Ecclesiazusae*, cf. S.F. Halliwell, 'Aristophanic sex: the erotics of shamelessness', in M.C. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (edd.), *The Sleep of Reason: Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Chicago and London, 2002), 120–42.

<sup>28</sup> Sommerstein (n. 6), 214–16 perhaps presents the final position of Praxagora, and of Lysistrata, in more emphatically monarchical terms than the plays themselves do (Blepyrus has fared badly at *Eccl.* 1131–3, despite Ussher on 1128–33). But clearly *oikos* and *polis* interact rewardingly at *Eccl.* 1112–83.

β. πιθὼν ... ἐκ. codd.). He ignores the hierarchy which places gods above men. But even in this case, the *oikos* is significant: the sycophant has lost *ἅπαντα τὰκ τῆς οἰκίας* (857).<sup>29</sup>

Chremylus' household is important in the play. His slave Carion begins with the familiar problem: his master is mad (*παραφρονούντος* 2). His relationship with his master is dwelt on at the start, part comically (26–7 *τῶν ἐμῶν γὰρ οἰκετῶν | πιστότατον ἡγοῦμαι σε καὶ κλεπίστατον*). He has a major role in the play. Chremylus' wife is given an extended time on stage as recipient of Carion's narrative (641–766); she then greets her husband warmly (788 *ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν*) and welcomes Wealth into her house. The god has been received both into Chremylus' house and into Athens (772–3 *Παλλάδος ... πέδον | χώραν τε πᾶσαν Κέκροπος ἦ μ' ἐδέξατο*, cf. 786–7): the two structures mingle. When Hermes deserts the gods for Chremylus' house (1147 *ξύνουικον ... δέξασθέ με*), it is as if he is also entering a new city (*πάτρις* 1151; 1146 alludes to the Athenian amnesty: *μὴ μνησικακήσης, εἰ σὺ Φύλῃν κατέλαβες*).

The particular story in the last part of the play concerns an amatory structure quite close to an *oikos* structure. The young man had been in a permanent relationship with the older woman; he was subservient to her because of money, though she was inferior to him in the hierarchy of youth and beauty. His relationship with her was in part motivated by his obligations within the structure of his own family: his sisters and mother required clothes (981–5). The amatory structure collapses with the advent of Wealth: the young man no longer needs his ageing mistress. The moral and aesthetic complexities of the situation are explored, with humour, but also thoughtfully: Chremylus' mixed concern and amusement guide the audience's responses (1084–5 *ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν οἶνον ἡξίους | πίνειν, συνεκποτέ' ἐστί σοι καὶ τὴν τρύγα*, 1095–6 *ὥς ἐντόνως ... τὸ γράδιον | ὥσπερ λεπὰς τῷ μεираκίῳ προσείχετο*, 1200–7). Their interest is yet again engaged in the operation of structures.

### III

#### *Wasps*

In the *Wasps*, house and city structures are incessantly combined; the discussion that follows will bring out in more detail how the combination operates within the play. It will point to the contrast between Bdelycleon's and Cleon's handling of

<sup>29</sup> On the political dimension of the *Plutus* cf. D. Konstan, *Greek Comedy and Ideology* (Oxford and New York, 1995), ch. 5. On *Plutus* in poetry and art see West on Hes. *Theog.* 593 and 969; K. Clinton, *LIMC* 7/1 (Zurich and Munich, 1994), 416–20. *Plutus* as a boy was already familiar iconographically (*LIMC* nos. 13, 17 ('Great Eleusinian Relief', Athens NM 126, c. 430; red-figure chous, Berlin F 2661, attr. Group of Athens 12144, c. 400, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1321.3); this throws light on Ar. *Plut.* 88–91, and Aristophanes' general conception. Hall and Geldart's conjecture at 949–50 is viewed with sympathy by N.G. Wilson, *Aristophanea: Studies on the Text of Aristophanes* (Oxford, 2007), 211; Strab. 13.1.66 (C614) would not present a sufficient defence of the MSS. At *Wasps* 1037–42 sycophants combine abuse of the *polis* structure with murderous violation of the *oikos* structure; it would be interesting to know if the content or words of the lost play (*Ὀλκάδες?*) are in any way reflected by 1039. (Cf. R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci*, 8 vols. to date [Berlin, 1983–], 3/2.226–7.) Wilson (above), 92–3 questions the text at 1040 – attractively, but night (1039) could connect the evil acts and schemes; cf. Chariton 1.7.1.

their structures which is an important element of this oblique comedy. Philocleon is involved in two different structures, with two very different people.

The hierarchy in the household is complex. The situation mixes features from various problematic actualities: the control of a mad parent, the care of an infirm parent – the latter an arrangement that Bdelycleon wants the very active Philocleon to accept. It is not apparent that Bdelycleon has formally replaced his father as head of the household (442 τὸν παλαιὸν δεσπότην has been misunderstood); and whatever the structure of power, the structure of respect should accord Philocleon a high place. Yet Bdelycleon, for all his surprising actions, is depicted as driven, not by a desire for power, status or enrichment, but by concern for his father, and for propriety.<sup>30</sup>

Cleon, on the other hand, is exploiting Philocleon and the quantitative structure; his professed concern is a sham, and he desires money. Assuredly the *Wasps* does not launch a frontal assault on Cleon, in the manner of the *Knights*. Thus it offers contrasting pointers as to how important Cleon will be: after the dream of Cleon (30–40), 62–3 οὐδ' ... αἰθρὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα μυττωτεύσομεν somewhat misleads, as in so many prologues. During the *agon* Cleon is mostly attacked in the form of unnamed plural demagogues (but cf. the climactic 757–9); there unexpectedly follows what may be called another *agon*, where he himself appears, thinly disguised as a household pet. Yet for all the teasing, the political argument is clear, within the comedy. The interweaving of the domestic and political sharpens the argument, but also produces the play's rich and attractive comic texture.<sup>31</sup>

At the start, the audience's eyes are fixed on the strangely barred and netted house; two slaves, presumably from the house, are guarding a beast within (κνώδαλον, 4). The audience's curiosity about the domestic situation is accompanied and increased by the slaves' exposition of their political dreams. The dreams involve the spaces of the *polis*: agora and Pnyx (16, 31–2). The second dream concerns the whole city (29 περὶ τῆς πόλεως γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ σκάφους ὅλου). It presents, with animal allegory, the overbearing Cleon, who harangues the assembly

<sup>30</sup> On the formal position in the household: the word δεσπότης in the play is not confined to a single person. It is used of Bdelycleon at 67–8 and then Philocleon at 87 (τοῦ δεσπότητος). Cf. e.g. Eur. *Andr.* 61 εἴ τις δεσποτῶν αἰσθήσεται, *Ion* 1183 τῷ νέῳ δὴ δεσπότην (*Ion*). The latter passage shows that 442 τὸν παλαιὸν δεσπότην is unlikely to mean 'who used to be head of the household' (cf. *ueteri* Plaut. *Capt.* 363) – so MacDowell on 613. As γήραι 441 and 447 τῶν παλαιῶν ἐμβάδων suggest, παλαιός here means 'aged', as e.g. *Ach.* 220, 676 οἱ γέροντες οἱ παλαιοὶ would lead one to expect here. More generally it is not apparent whether formal position is relinquished together with control of household affairs; so at Dem. 47.34 (D.M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* [London, 1978], 91–2) οἰκότη ... παρὰ τῷ πατρί suggests that the household remains nominally the father's. The result of actions concerning a demented parent, if they actually happened, are a different matter; but Plato *Laws* 11.929d3–e8 could be extreme (contrast possibly αὐτὸ μόνον τοῦνομα at Aeschin. 3.251; *Wasps* 1354 might involve secondary play on such actions). As for actual control, 611–17 do indeed imply that Bdelycleon organizes the food, though the passage might be a generalized exploitation of care for the decrepit rather than background clues for the audience to reconstruct the situation. Bdelycleon's role as wine pourer (616), if literal, indicates respect in the arrangement (cf. *Theb.* 2.3–4 West). The notion of respect and affection is clear e.g. at Isae. 2.10, 18, 20, 36–7.

<sup>31</sup> For the treatment of Cleon in the play, and the circumstances behind it, see A.H. Sommerstein, 'Notes on Aristophanes' *Wasps*', *CQ* 27 (1977), 261–77, at 262; I.C. Storey, 'Wasps 1284–91 and the portrait of Kleon in *Wasps*', *Scholia* NS 4 (1995), 3–23.



and wishes to divide the *demos* (41 τὸν δῆμον ἡμῶν βούλεται διυστάναι). So the introduction is already bringing both structures into the audience's consciousness.<sup>32</sup>

When Philocleon's condition is finally revealed, it revolves around the spaces of house and *polis*. Bdelycleon wishes, and eventually forces, him to stay in the house; Philocleon intends to be in the courts (cf. e.g. 104–5 προκαθεύδει ... ὥσπερ λεπὰς προσεχόμενος τῷ κίονι). The capture in the house is compared to Athens' present siege of Scione (209–10). The domestic situation is remarkable. A formal or former head of the house is physically imprisoned inside it; even women and children were not kept in by nets (for the comparison cf. 1355 φυλάττομαι σφόδρα, of Philocleon as youth). His numerous attempts to break out, repressed by son and slaves, highlight the physicality and the strange distortion of structure. Philocleon calls out ὦ ξυνδικασταὶ καὶ Κλέων, ἀμύνετε (197). It is becoming evident that Philocleon is a representative of the *demos*, and particularly its poorer elements; Cleon's untoward control of the *polis* structure appears.<sup>33</sup>

The chorus visually present a mass: τὸ πλῆθος (267) indicates a large group, and as often in Aristophanes the word gestures to the Athenian people (cf. 593 περὶ τοῦ πλῆθους δὲ μάχεσθαι, 667; *Ach.* 317, etc.). The chorus's poverty and domestic dependence on the pay is made obvious: so 302 σὺ δὲ σὺκά μ' αἰτεῖς (squabbles with their children). They depict themselves as representing the Athenian class τοῖς πένησιν (464; cf. τὸν δῆμον 888). The children are sent to get Cleon, the chorus's protector (408–14). The chorus are old and feeble but also, in an expressive contradiction, powerful and dangerous: this is what the perversion of the jury system has created. The anger and violence of the chorus, graphically seen in their stings, embody the power and irrationality of the *demos* – or a part of it, if one prefers. The violence is strongly connected with the democratic institution of the law courts (e.g. 420–1), put to twisted use. Their shouting also manifests their reluctance to debate: so the reasonable Bdelycleon at 415 ὠγαθοί, τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἀκούσατ', ἀλλὰ μὴ κεκγράγετε, 470 ἔσθ' ὅπως ἄνευ μάχης καὶ τῆς κατοξείας βοῆς | εἰς λόγους ἔλθοιμεν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ διαλλαγάς;. Shouting is a weapon of Cleon's too.<sup>34</sup>

The individual Bdelycleon is set against the chorus's fearsome plurality. In the chorus's opinion, Bdelycleon is μισόπολις (411), and μισόδημος (474). He displays and aims at τυραννίς (417, 487) and is a μοναρχίας ἐραστής (474, cf. 470). Such solo aspirations are freely combined with conspiracy, that is membership of a small group (ξυνωμότης 345, 483, cf. 488 ὡς ἅπανθ' ὑμῖν τυραννίς

<sup>32</sup> On the house in *Wasps* cf. G. Crane, 'Oikos and agora: mapping the polis in Aristophanes' *Wasps*', in G.W. Dobrov (ed.), *The City as Comedy: Representation in Athenian Drama* (Chapel Hill and London, 1997), 198–229. For the netting of τὴν αὐλήν ἄπασαν (131), cf. W. Höpfner et al., in W. Höpfner (ed.), *Geschichte des Wohnens*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1999), 240–3.

<sup>33</sup> After a successful action for insanity, κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι ... καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, according to Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.49 (note the καί). Whether these actions in fact occurred is uncertain: cf. e.g. S. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford, 1993), 108, 245; A.R.W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens*<sup>2</sup> (London, 1998), 1.79–81. Even if such notions lurk in the background here, the departure from normal structures is still salient.

<sup>34</sup> It is most likely significant that in the sentence before 415, Cleon is to be called with a shout (409 θεῖτε καὶ βοᾶτε καὶ Κλέωνι ταῦτ' ἀγγέλλετε), as at 197–8 Φι. ὦ ... Κλέων ... | Βδ. ἔνδον κέκραχθι; shouting and Cleon go together in this play (cf. 596, etc.). The audience may wonder at 409 if Cleon will appear: see Sommerstein (n. 31), 262, and cf. the appearance of Lamachus after *Ach.* 567–72. Vehement anger is seen as having a significant place in Athenian politics by D.S. Allen, 'Angry bees, wasps, and jurors: the symbolic politics of ὀργή in Athens', *YCIS* 32 (2003), 76–98; but it is less positively evaluated in the *Wasps*.

ἔστι καὶ ξυνωμόται); both schemes combat the quantitative principle. Bdelycleon's imprisonment of his father within the house is seen as more a political than a familial outrage (e.g. 335–45). The legal places which Philocleon desires are, for him, where he belongs, more than his home (so 389–94, esp. 393 τὸν σαυτοῦ παησιόχωρον).

In the *agon* Bdelycleon seeks to win over through argument both the chorus and Philocleon. Philocleon for these purposes is clearly a representative of the *demos* (or of a part of it). Cf. e.g. 577 φάσκων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχειν, 698–712, 715–18. He particularly represents the poor as a group, in conflict with the rich (575 τοῦ πλούτου καταχρήνη, 627 κέγκεχόδασιν μ' οἱ πλουτοῦντες; 698–703). The central dispute is over whether Philocleon rules, or is a slave (517 δουλεύων λέληθας, 602, 653, 681–2): a household metaphor is applied politically.

Philocleon sets Cleon's quasi-maternal care for him and his fellows against Bdelycleon's lack of care for his father (596–8; Cleon wards off the flies like the mother in Hom. *Il.* 4.130–1). The power which Cleon gives Philocleon establishes his desired version of domestic hierarchy (605–18); thanks to the pay, the women affect to love him, and he is not dependent on his son's dining arrangements (612–13 κοῦ μή με δεήσῃ | εἰς σέ βλέψαι καὶ τὸν ταμίαν). Bdelycleon combines rational political rhetoric with cajoling domestic intimacy. So he affectionately urges his παππίδιον to stop scowling (655), and then bids him execute some financial calculation of the state's income from tribute and taxation (656–60). The demagogues' false protestations of devotion to the *demos* are exposed by the loyal son: so 666–8, where the politician's voice is followed by the son's, σὺ γάρ, ὦ πάτερ, αὐτοὺς | ἄρχειν αἰρεῖ σαυτοῦ ... The provision the son is offering the father at home is climactically set against the false promises of the politicians (715–24).<sup>35</sup>

The *agon*, then, demonstrates the demagogues' abuse of the *polis* structure and of its quantitative principle: the people are not in charge. The *agon* takes place between father and son, so within an *oikos* structure; Bdelycleon's overbearing of domestic propriety, captivity and all, emerges as benign (719 ὧν οὐνεκ' ἐγὼ σ' ἀπέκλειον ἀεὶ; the politicians are contrasted, 720–1). The trial scene promptly offers, as was mentioned, another *agon*, with the same balance of form and procedure (919–20 ... πρὶν ἂν γ' ἀκούσῃς ἀμφοτέρων echo 725–6 πρὶν ἂν ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἀκούσῃς ...). This time politics is not the topic of debate, but appears directly in a domestic allegory, or fable: a political trial is enacted by two dogs. The outcome of this *agon* is not primarily of importance, within the play, for itself: Labes' guilt and punishment matter less than Philocleon's act of acquittal. It is a sort of meta-*agon*. The behaviour and interaction of Philocleon and Bdelycleon has both a political and a domestic point.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> For Bdelycleon's persuasion of Philocleon, see J.F. McGlew, "'Speak on my behalf': persuasion and purification in Aristophanes' *Wasps*", *Arethusa* 37 (2004), 11–36. Uses of the address 'father' in the scene mix the structures of *oikos* and *polis*, directly so at 652; cf. also 556–8, 609. For tactically affectionate diminutives of 'father', and the application of 'father' to non-fathers, cf. Sommerstein on *Peace* 120 and E. Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address: From Herodotus to Lucian* (Oxford, 1996), 61–2, 78–81.

<sup>36</sup> On the actual basis for the trial, cf. Sommerstein on 240. For a trial in an animal fable cf. e.g. Phaedr. 1.10 (F. Rodríguez Adrados, *History of the Graeco-Latin Fable*, Mnemosyne Suppl. 201, 207, 236, 3 vols. [Leiden and Boston, 1999–2003], 3.505–6). A connection with Aesopic fable appears in Philocleon's related story of the barking dog at 1401–5 (Adrados 3.384). It is unclear what connotations would attend an anthropomorphic fable on house animals: possibly a homely form, for the children, cf. 1179–85 (1181 τῶν γε πάνν κατ' οἰκίαν), Adrados 3.232–3; but contrast 1258–60.

Domestic and public space are now superimposed (cf. 800–4: home trials for the Athenians). The longed-for shrine of Lycus must be simulated (819–24, cf. 389–4), as must the exclusive railings (829–34, 844–6); Bdelycleon remarks on the power of *φιλοχωρία* (834). The figure of Cyon presents the abuser of the *polis* structure more directly than before; he also takes us further than before into the purely domestic. The dog's barking is here a domesticized parody of Cleon's angry shouting; his threat οὐ κεκλάγξομαι (930) echoes the *κεκραγ-* characteristic of Cleon (596, cf. *Knights* 137, 256, 274, etc.), as also of the chorus (226, 415, etc.; Philocleon 198). The personified cheese-grater forms the summit of household fantasy (963–6); but the question whether it grated τοῖς στρατιώταις highlights the quantitative issues. Did Labes give cheese to all or just to himself, neglecting the other individual, Cyon (908–17; 923 *μονοφαγίστατον*)? The plurals used to Philocleon as jury and *demos* (ὕμᾱς 915, ἄνδρες 950) bring out the interaction of Philocleon's political and domestic roles. Bdelycleon's οἰκτίρατ' αὐτόν, ὦ πάτερ (975) violates grammar to make the roles clash. When Cyon unites his own interests and those of the people, with palpable injustice, Bdelycleon, with palpable justice, urges his father to hear both sides (914–20). On the whole Bdelycleon combines reason, rhetoric and filial affection: for the last cf. 986 ἴθ', ὦ πατρίδιον, ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω τρέπον. But even he is guilty of dishonesty (for therapeutic purposes); he rigs the votes for the dodgy Labes. The comedy spares no one.

The parabasis turns round the allegory of the wasps. Their sting becomes principally an image, not of the harm they inflict within the city at the behest of politicians, but of their generation's fight for the city against the barbarian foe (1075–90, 1120–1; contrast 1113 *κεντοῦμεν* as jurors). Epirrhema and antepirrhema (1071–90, 1102–21) contrast the two eras of their activity, patriotic and pernicious, and stress their quantity. The parabasis also depicts (1029–37) the legendary conflict of the individual poet as Heracles with the individual Cleon as monster, in the *Knights*. The more oblique approach of this play emerges by contrast; but ὑπὲρ ὕμῶν ἔτι καὶ νυνὶ πολεμεῖ (1037) in context implies that the conflict with Cleon is continuing (cf. μετ' αὐτόν). That must include this play. The dog-like monster is bound to connect with the representation of Cleon as dog that has just been witnessed, even if the image goes back to the *Knights* (e.g. 1017–19) and the description is recycled in the *Peace* (754–60). Cleon as monster in the prologue is also linked (34–8, cf. 1035 *φώκης δ' ὀσμὴν*).<sup>37</sup>

The unusually short second 'half' of the play does not combine the political and the domestic so directly. The relationship of son and father forms the frame for Bdelycleon's rise into a higher sphere of Athenian society. Now Philocleon will imitate the rich (1168–71), and learn to participate in elite symposia. His attitude to wearing *Λακωνικά* (1156–65) suggests a connection between class and attitude to Spartans (cf. 475 *ξυνὼν Βρασιδαί*), and probably to oligarchy. Bdelycleon puts himself and his father into an imaginary scene in a rich and elaborately adorned house (1213–17). Present at the supposed symposium are Cleon and his cronies. Even for the audience, the point will hover between the strangeness of such a locale for Cleon and the suspiciousness of his wealth (note *κλέπτῃς* 1227). The symposiasts at 1301–2 will be much more aristocratic. The occasion permits some more political attack on Cleon (1223–35), and more depiction of his verbal violence. In their role play, Bdelycleon for a moment actually takes on the part

<sup>37</sup> On the description cf. G. Mastromarco, 'L'eroe e il mostro (Aristofane, *Vespe* 1029–1044)', *RIFC* 117 (1989), 410–23, at 416–21.

of Cleon (1224 καὶ δὴ γὰρ εἰμ' ἐγὼ Κλέων). He then drops the part to warn his father, who has called Cleon a villain and thief, how Cleon will shout and say he will destroy him (1228–30). The dramatic mingling of roles and voices highlights an opposition. Cleon's change of tune to the new Philocleon contrasts with Bdelycleon's constancy to his father. Bdelycleon's treatment of his hopeless pupil joins kindness and honest exasperation. The second parabasis plays on feasting with rich and poor (1265–74) and directly presents, in the first person, the poet's conflict with Cleon (1284–91); this play would seem to form part of it.

The *oikos* structure comes to the fore in Philocleon's post-prandial misdeeds. Bdelycleon's plan to take Philocleon everywhere with him (1003–6), and his attempts to instruct him, have already suggested an inversion of age and roles. Philocleon now behaves like a *νεανίας*, and is one (1307, 1333, 1355, 1362). His abduction of Dardanis enables him to present himself as if an only son, closely guarded by his father, whose death he awaits (1351–9; different conception 1354–5). But the 'father' is τὸ ... υἱδίον (1356); πατήρ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πλὴν ἐμοῦ (1359) plays neatly on the usual pyramid of the power structure, where there can be only one father but there are commonly several sons. The real son is not concerned with his own pleasure or the advantages of his father's death. He once again struggles to contain his father within the house (1443–9); he physically carries him against his will, as if he were a child. The hierarchy, after many complications, has turned upside down. But Bdelycleon's crossness and physical action do not obscure his love of his father. He is actually willing to undergo trial on his father's behalf (1418–20); the chorus praise his love of his father, and his gentleness (*φιλοπατρίαν* 1465, *ἀγανῶι* 1466).<sup>38</sup>

The law is no longer a part of the *polis* structure in which Philocleon delights. The appurtenances of legal places, once loved, are now loathed (1339 βάλλε κημούς, cf. 99, 754–5). Philocleon now detests trials (1336–7 οὐδ' ἀκούων ἀνέχομαι | δικῶν); he ignores the institutions which seek to regulate the interaction of individuals (so 1407 τοὺς ἀγορανόμους, 1441 ἕως ἂν τὴν δίκην ἄρχων καλῇ). The scene sets itself in public space (*ἐν ἀγορᾷ* 1372). The *polis* and its institutions cannot constrain the individual Philocleon.

At the end of the play, Philocleon bursts out of the house once more (*οἰκίαν* 1475, *ἀλλεῖοισι θύραις* 1482). He paradoxically mixes old and young: he outdoes a younger father's sons in dancing; he champions the old tragic dances, but aims to show contemporary tragic dancers as the real *Κρόνοι* (1480–1). We return to the idea of madness, implied in the opening (cf. 71–135, esp. 119–20): now it is directly named (1486 μάλλον δέ γ' ἴσως μανίας ἀρχή, 1496 μανικὰ πράγματα, cf. 1489). But this is not a sad and senile *παράνοια*: Philocleon's madness finishes the play with a jubilant vitality, which the house and household cannot contain.

<sup>38</sup> Bdelycleon is acted by a big man (68); this will make the carrying more effective. Cf. for parents' carrying of children e.g. *Clouds* 1384–5 (baby), Hom. *Il.* 16.7–10; for old men as children e.g. *Clouds* 1417. Commentators do not mention that the name *Dardanis* (1371) is chosen to prepare for *δαίς* (1372); perhaps it seems too obvious. On the last part of the *Wasps*, and its relation to the spaces of the play, cf. G. Jay-Robert, 'L'espace chez Aristophane. Exemple des *Acharniens*, de la *Paix*, de *Lysistrata* et des *Guêpes*', *REG* 116 (2003), 418–44, at 441–3.

## IV

This swift survey of ten plays, and longer treatment of one, should suffice to demonstrate the importance of the two main structures, and to suggest how extensively and inventively Aristophanes relates and opposes them. The final section will draw some aspects together, with particular attention to how individuals overcome these structures. It should be stressed again that the attempt is to see what happens in the plays; it is assumed that humour and fantasy are heavily involved, and not assumed that Aristophanes is straightforwardly presenting his views of domestic and political reality.<sup>39</sup>

In the plays, the structures of *oikos* and *polis* are far from preventing action which contravenes them. The forces which are used to support the structures include threatened violence – or punishment, according to perspective (so *Ach.* 319–20, *Wasps* 403–4, *Lys.* 519–20). Control of money can support the *oikos* structure (so *Wasps* 1354–7). Subtler are moral premises. In the *polis* it is a basic premise that one should obey the laws (so *Eccl.* 762–8, where the premise is disputed). The laws of the *polis* also underpin the structure of the *oikos* (so *Clouds* 1421–2, *Birds* 757, 1353–7, *Birds* 1660–6). Both structures are sustained by tradition; in the *oikos* this includes a passing of principles and characteristics from parents to children (*Peace* 1265–304, *Birds* 1362–4, *Plutus* 28–38). Reference in the *polis* to οἱ πατέρες, and the like (e.g. *Knights* 565–76), derives from the *oikos* structure, generalized across the city. Thus the two structures are both parallel and interconnected in their sources of support and reinforcement.<sup>40</sup>

But the plays particularly concern themselves with how those in an inferior position, hierarchically or quantitatively, seek to prevail against the structures. The means in the two structures are largely parallel, and often interlace the structures in specific situations. Particularly important is deception, essential for cunning women and corrupt politicians alike (so *Knights* 1117–18, *Thesm.* 407–8, *Eccl.* 237–8). An especially colourful form of it on stage is disguise (so *Ach.* 113–22, *Eccl.* 68–9). The offer of material inducements, in home or city, can be linked with, or detached from, deception (so *Knights* 50–2; *Wasps* 115–17, 611–12). Displays of affection are perhaps seen as belonging by nature to a domestic or amorous structure (e.g. *Wasps* 655); but they are much appropriated by demagogues (e.g. *Knights* 773, 1340–5; cf. 1215).<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Most but not all of the passages cited in parentheses below have been less curiously mentioned in Sections II and III. In general, those sections provide the basis for this.

<sup>40</sup> On family violence see W. Schmitz, 'Gewalt in Haus und Familie', in G. Fischer and S. Moraw (edd.), *Die andere Seite der Klassik. Gewalt im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Stuttgart), 103–28, at 110–18 on children, and 120–3 on spouses (here little is added, notably, to the passage in the *Lysistrata*). The passing on of family values illustrates the intricacy of actual structures. So the grave stele Athens NM 766 (*CAT* 2.051, *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1311, c. 430–410?), where the parents praise the daughter's σωφροσύνη in the inscription, and the mother is the most prominent figure in the relief, might seem to suggest that the daughter particularly imitates the mother: gender and hierarchy here combine rather than children of both sexes learning from the father. On the relief see C.W. Clairmont, *Classical Attic Tombstones*, 6 vols. (Kilchberg, 1993–5), 2.80–1; C. Breuer, *Reliefs und Epigramme griechischer Privatgrabmäler. Zeugnisse bürgerlichen Selbstverständnisses vom 4. bis 2. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 1995), 18 (with pl. 1). On the obligation to obey the laws, see G.O. Hutchinson, 'Morality and time in fifth- and fourth-century Greek literature', *Eikasmos* 22 (2011), forthcoming.

<sup>41</sup> On amorous language in relation to the *polis*, see V. Wohl, *Love among the Ruins: The Erotics of Democracy in Classical Athens* (Princeton, 2002); A. Scholtz (n. 26), chs. 2 and 3.

All these means are aimed at getting round the structures without the objection of hierarchical or numerical superiors. The structures can be more openly defied, in words or action or both. In the *Acharnians*, or at *Lysistrata* 525–6, direct action in defiance of structures follows verbal attempts within the structures. In the *Clouds*, Pheidippides accompanies his beating of his father with argumentative assaults on the moral premises of family hierarchy (1409–14) and on city law (1421–6). However, the quantitative principle of the *polis* structure is seldom attacked explicitly.

Even Pheidippides is trying to persuade his father; persuasion can of course operate without any defiance. When persuasion is formalized as rhetoric, it is particularly associated with the *polis* structure. The forms both of the *agon* and of the long, eloquent speech have links with the law court and the assembly. Such forms often set an individual against either a mass or a representative of *demos* or *polis* (so Philocleon at *Wasps* 526–724, the Proboulos at *Lys.* 476–613). None the less, domestic elements and structure often enter in, as in the instances mentioned, or the *agon* of *Knights* and assembly of *Thesmophoriazusae*. Women can beat the structures, and rise to success in male rhetoric.

Commendable and reprehensible types of rhetoric are opposed; they are joined with ways of counteracting the structures that are (within the plays) laudable or deplorable. The equality of the *polis* structure facilitates a ferocious and noisy manner from demagogues and others. Their shouting and thundering draws on the oratory of Cleon (cf. Thuc. 3.36.6) and earlier of Pericles, and highlights its suspect and unreasonable violence. The supreme satire is domestic: Cleon as the barking Cyon in *Wasps* (e.g. 929–30). The praiseworthy rhetoricians display rationality and fairness (so *Lys.* 431–2, 1124–8). This can include honest crossness and candid straight talking (so *Lys.* 1124–8, *Eccl.* 205), distinct from the fierceness and flattery of demagogues. The desirable oratory confronts its listeners' ill-founded rage with justice and careful thought (so *Ach.* 560–1, *Wasps* 655–7 – the latter instance addressed to the speaker's father).<sup>42</sup>

Such investigation of how Aristophanes exploits and interconnects the two structures may lead, it is hoped, to some new understanding of his work. The aims and point of his treatment lie beyond the present argument. Some hints have been given, however, and a little more may be ventured on scope. Various views could reasonably be taken. Aristophanes could be seen as aiming at limited targets, like Cleon, but accidentally touching larger ones, like rhetorical democracy. He could

Aristophanes' presentation of politicians' deceit is well connected with oratorical invective by M. Heath, 'Aristophanes and the discourse of politics', in Dobrov (n. 32), 230–49, at 231–3; it is another question whether Aristophanes is principally satirizing political discourse. Cf. also N. Worman, *Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 2008).

<sup>42</sup> Cf. fr. 489 KA; Pers. 5.91–2. On Aristophanes' handling of Cleon cf. L. Edmunds, *Cleon, Knights, and Aristophanes' Politics* (Lanham, New York, London, 1988). Chs. 2 and 3 deal with the idea of shaking up and disturbance, an aspect of demagoguery which stands between the verbal and the practical. Cf. e.g. *Knights* 836–40, *Peace* 268–70. See earlier W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton, 1971). But Aristophanes' attitude to Pericles seems related (cf. *Peace* 606–11); and Cratinus' attacks on Pericles offer important context for Aristophanes' attacks on Cleon (and perhaps on the war). Cf. M. Revermann, 'Cratinus' Διονυσιαλέξανδρος and the head of Pericles', *JHS* 117 (1997), 197–200; M. Noussia, 'The language of tyranny in Cratinus, *PCG* 258', *PCPhS* 52 (2003), 74–88; Sommerstein (n. 6), 3, 160–1, 286. On the idea of frank speech in democracy see J. Henderson, 'Attic Old Comedy, frank speech and democracy', in D.A. Boedeker and K.A. Raaflaub (edd.), *Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-century Athens* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1998), 255–73, at 255–60.

also be seen as aiming simply at humour. One might say, more sceptically, that it depends on the hearer how far the intellectual implications of humour are followed through. And yet Aristophanes' emphasis on his own and his audience's cleverness, however self-interested, could be thought to justify setting a high level for the most adequate understanding of his plays. (Cf. e.g. Thuc. 3.38.5–7 for the Athenians' image of themselves as keenly intelligent listeners.) If we confined Aristophanes' concerns to humorous effects or to a series of specific targets, we would not well account for his persistent pursuit of relationships and entanglements between the two structures, and the evasion and inversion of those structures.<sup>43</sup>

We might, then, see Aristophanes' stories, scenes and humour as doing something like the work of sophists and philosophers: making the familiar unfamiliar and stimulating thoughts. But that comparison will only take us so far: Aristophanes appears less interested than such thinkers in attaining general conclusions. As regards these structures, a depiction of the full experience which the plays offer would combine intelligent and intriguing exploration, arresting drama and story-telling, and absurd and imaginative invention. It would remain possible to suppose that household, state and their relations were no less interestingly handled in this *œuvre* than in Herodotus or tragedy.

*Exeter College, University of Oxford*

G. O. HUTCHINSON

gregory.hutchinson@exeter.ox.ac.uk

<sup>43</sup> Such persistence, if indeed distinctive (cf. n. 3), could be perceived by viewers: Aristophanes' presentation of himself and other dramatists indicates that Athenians could see beyond individual plays to a writer's preoccupations and tendencies.